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CoRPORATIONs-REsTRICTIONS ON HoLDING REAL EsTATE-lNTERPRETATION OF MrcHIGAN's CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION-While it is
now well settled that a corporation has the power to acquire and hold
real estate, this power may be limited by the charter creating the corporation, by legislative enactments of a general nature,1 or by specific constitutional provisions. When such a limitation is imposed by constitution, a problem of construction arises in interpreting it in a workable
way after the social conditions motivating it have changed or disappeared.
Illustra~ive of one type of restriction on the right of corporations
to hold land, Michigan's constitution provides:
"No corporation shall hold any real estate for a longer period
than ten years, except such real estate as shall be actually occupied
by such corporation in the exercise of its franchises." 2
This provision was interpreted for the first time in the recent case
of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co.3 Plaintiff insurance company entered into a contract with defendant to purchase land in Michigan on which to erect a housing project. Defendant's promise to convey was conditioned on the existence of plaintiff's
right, inter alia, to own and operate the project for thirty years or more.
Defendant refused to convey, stating that the quoted section of the
constitution would not permit plaintiff to hold such real estate for more
than ten years, since the lands were not to be "actually occupied" by
plaintiff in the exercise of its franchises. In an action for specific performance of the contract, the Michigan Supreme Court ordered conveyance, saying: A corporation which uses land it has acquired for corporate purposes under its franchise, occupies such land within the meaning of the exception to the constitutional prohibition against corporate
owne~ship of real estate for more than ten years. 4 The court took judicial notice of, and was clearly impressed by, the present housing shortage in Michigan, the large amounts of capital required to alleviate the
condition, the fact that such large sums are usually obtainable only
from corporations having capital to invest, and the probable hesitancy
of corporations to invest in housing if their right to hold such property
were limited to ten years.
13 AM. Jun., Corps., §§775, 778 (1938).
Michigan Constitution, art. 12, §5 (1908).
a 322 Mich. 209, 33 N.W. (2d) 763 (1948).
4 Id. at 210.
1
2
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I. Interpretation of the Restriction
a. Historical aspects. Constitutional and statutory restrictions on the
power of corporations to hold real estate are lineal descendants of the
old mortmain statutes of England. 5 That these statutes have never
been considered part of the law of Michigan is indicated by the language
of cases both before and after adoption of the constitutional provision
now under consideration. 6 The survival of the restrictions has been
attributed to a persistence, in this field at least, of an inherent distrust of
corporations, originating in the days when society was primarily agrarian. This distrust was based principally upon the monopolistic tendencies of corporations, and entered into the political thinking of the
drafters of both federal and state constitutions. 7 Although wide-spread
adoption of the general corporation act, with its inhibiting effect upon
monopoly, set many of these fears at rest, 8 the distrust of corporate
power still existed during the middle of the nineteenth century when
the Michigan constitutional limitation was 6.rst adopted. 9 Evidence of
these early fears remains impressed upon Michigan statute books today.10
Nevertheless, a review of the later cases and statutes11 clearly indicates a subsidence of early distrust and a change of legislative and judicial policy to acceptance of the corporation as a necessary and desirable
r, "The prime object of the rnortrnain acts was to repress the alarming influence of ecclesi•
astical corporations which had, even as early as the Norman conquest, monopolized so much
of the land in England." Two objects only were contemplated by the acts: first, to prevent
withdrawal of feudal services in defense of the realm, and second, to secure to the lords and
crown their escheats and other privileges and profits. Lathrop v. Commercial Bank, 8 Dana
(38 Ky.) 114 at 122, 124, 33 Arn. Dec. 481 (1839); quoted in 19 C.J.S., Corps., §1089,
n. 75 (1947).
r. Bank of Michigan v. Niles, 1 Doug (Mich.) 401, 407, 41 Arn. Dec. 575 (1844) (decided before the constitutional provision). The rnortrnain statutes forbade a corporation to
acquire or hold land other than under a license granted to it by the crown or parliament.
McDonogh v. Murdock, 15 How. (15 U.S.) 367 at 405 (1853). In 1872, the Michigan Supreme Court held that where a corporation is created in one state with powers to take, hold
and convey lands in another state where the legislature had not expressly or by implication
forbidden it, an affirmative enabling act by the latter state was not necessary. Thompson v.
Waters, 25 Mich. 214 at 215, 12 Arn. Rep. 243 (1872). Had the rnortrnain statutes been
in effect in Michigan, such a ruling could not have been made.
7 1 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., pp. 7 et seq. (1931).
8 Ibid.
o The provision first appeared in the Constitution of 1850. It was subsequently re-adopted
without change in 1867, and again with a slight modification in 1908. See principal case at
223 et seq. See also the language in Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214 at 228, 12 Am. Rep.
243 (1872); cited by dissent in principal case at 214.
JO Cf. the rigid restrictions on rights of banks and insurance companies to hold real
estate; 17 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) *!1487.37, 511.10.
11 E.g., Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 246 Mich. 261, 224 N.W. 621 (1924); Mich. Gen.
Corp. Act, Mich Comp. Laws (1948) §450.1.
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element of society. This change of attitude opened the way for a narrow
construction of the constitutional limitation.

b. Canons of construction. It is a general rule that the language of
a constitutional provision should be given its natural significance, unless
to do so would contravene the manifest intention of the framers. 12 It is
only when a constitutional provision is ambiguous that extrinsic matters
will be considered in construing it;13 when this is the case, an interpretation should be adopted which carries out the broad general principles
of government stated in the document and gives effect to the intent and
purpose of the framers and those who adopted it.14
A minority of the court in the Hancock case, evidently feeling that
there was no ambiguity in the restrictive clause, looked to the instrument
alone for the intent and purpose of the framers. They felt that the intent
of the framers had been expressed by previously enunciated interpretations of the words "actually occupied," to the effect that a corporation
could not "actually occupy" portions of buildings or parts of real estate
rented to third parties. Therefore, the minority concluded that an insurance company could not own and operate a housing project for more
than ten years under the restrictions imposed by the constitution.
The majority, however, without mentioning ambiguity, looked beyond the instrument to the proceedings of the constitutional conventions
for the intent of the framers. Interpreting the constitutional restriction
in the light of that intent, they decided an insurance company could
hold a housing project for more than ten years. Since no mention is
made of ambiguity, the majority must have found that to give the words
their natural meanings would contravene the intention of the framers.
The word "occupy," in its legal application, is ordinarily thought of
as synonymous with "possession," though the cases indicate that no universal ,legal definition may be successfully attached to it. 15 The word
"actually" is commonly understood to mean, "as an actual or existing
fact, not 'constructively.' "16 The use of the word in conjunction with
"occupied" literally precludes a "constructive" occupancy. Adopting the
Michigan concept of the nature of a corporation as a being artificial but
nonetheless real,1 7 and the necessary consequence that its "realness"
must be found in the natural persons and tangible property associated
12

16 C.J.S., Con. Law, §19 (1947).

1s Id., §29.
14 Id., §16.
15 See 29 WoRDs

& PHRASES, perm. ed., pp. 125 et seq. (1946); principal case at 216
et seq.; Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 79 Am. Dec. 88 (1861); 51 C.J.S., Landlord and
Tenant, §2, n. 32 (1947), citing Morrill v. Machman, 24 Mich. 279, 9 Am. Rep. 124 (1872).
10 2 WoRDS & PHRASES, perm ed., pp. 205-208 (1946).
11 W1tcus & HAMILTON, l\.1IcmcAN GENERAL CORPORATION Acn: 4 (1932).
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with it, the "actuality" of occupation by the corporation must rest on
some degree of occupancy by its officers, agents or employees.
In seeking the degree of "occupancy" intended by the framers of
the Michigan constitution, two alternatives are immediately apparent.
It might be held that they contemplated the imposition of a restriction
which would prevent a corporation from holding land for more than
ten years except that which \Vas under the exclusive control of the officers, agents and employees of the corporation. This was evidently the
opinion of the minority of the Michigan court. The consequences of
such an interpre~ation, however, would be far-reaching. Under Michigan law a corporation may be properly organized to purchase, hold, sell
and deal in real estate.18 The Michigan Supreme Court has held, in
interpreting the powers of such corporations, that the erection of buildings for income purposes was fairly included within their franchises. 19
Many corporation-owned buildings, constructed primarily to house corporate administrative units, either in anticipation of future expansion20
or as an out-and-out investment,21 today contain office and service space
occupied by lessees. Had the court adopted this construction of the
restriction, such holdings would have had to be disposed of.
On the other hand, it might be found that the framers meant something less than "exclusive" occupancy or possession when they used the
words "actually occupied." They could not have intended, for example,
to virtually prohibit profitable utilization of surplus space provided in
anticipation of future expansion, by requiring a corporation unable to
forecast accurately future business trends to forfeit its entire holding at
the end of ten years. Necessarily, some lesser degree of occupancy must
have been intended; therefore a latent ambiguity existed which permitted the court to look to extrinsic matters in its determination. This,
it is suggested, is the process followed by the majority _of the l\·1ichigan
court in the principal case. Looking to the debates of the constitutional
conventions, the court found that the framers intended "actually occupied" to be the equivalent of "used or needed." 22 While the debates
may bear out the finding of the court, it must be remarked that such an
interpretation convicts the framers of a less than careful choice of language, the usual presumption of constitutional construction to the contrary notwithstanding. 23
18

Stott v. Stott Realty Co., 246 Mich. 261, 224 N.W. 621 (1929).

19 Ibid.

20
21
22
23

People ex rel. Moloneyv. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 ill. 125, 51 N.E. 664 (1898).
Note 18, supra.
Principal case at 228.
16 C.J.S., Con. Law, §14, n. 27 (1947).
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2. What Is Left of the Restriction?
The question remains as to what, if any, restriction on the right of
a corporation to hold land for a period greater than ten years remains in
the Michigan constitution under this interpretation.
It is a general rule that a corporation has only such powers as are
expressly granted in its charter or in the statutes under which it is created, or such powers as are necessary for the purpose of carrying out its
express powers and the object of its incorporation. 24 These implied
powers are not limited to such as are indispensable for these purposes,
but comprise all that are appropriate and suitable, including the right
of reasonable choice of means to be employed. Further, acts which,
standing alone or engaged in as a business, would be beyond the powers
of the corporation are not necessarily ultra vires when they are merely a
part of an entire transaction which in its general scope is within the
corporate purpose. 25
Ariy holding of land for a proper business purpose is permissible
under the Michigan General Corporation Act. 26 Under the decision
of the principal case, such land may be held for the life of the corporation, provided only that the land is used or needed in carrying out the
corporate franchises. In view of the broad powers now written into corporate charters, it is submitted that under the language of the decision,
if not on the facts, there is no "limit" left in whatever limitation the
framers intended when they wrote: "No corporation shall hold any real
estate for a longer period than ten years, except. ..." The case is further
proof that the constitution is what the judges say it is.

W.M.Myers

13 AM. Jun., Corps. §739 (1938).
Id., §740.
2s Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.I0(d).
24
25

